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Abstract
The main contribution of this thesis is the development and application of a modified
Exponentially Weighted Moving Algorithm (EWMA) algorithm, and its ability to robustly
function in the face varying numbers of bad (malicious or malfunctioning) Special
Protection System (SPS) nodes. Simulation results support the use of the proposed
modified EWMA reputation based trust module in SPSs within a smart grid environment.
This modification results in the ability to easily maintain the system above the minimum
acceptable frequency of 58.8 Hz at the 95% confidence interval, when challenged with test
cases containing 5, 10 and 15 bad node test cases out of 31 total load nodes.
These promising results are realized by incorporating the optimal modified EWMA
strategy, as identified by Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) techniques, where an
optimal strategy is revealed. The optimal strategy maximizes true positives while
minimizing false positives.
Implementation of a modified EWMA within a reputation based special protection
system does not account for each scenario that an electrical power engineer may face in
the field. Instead, this research demonstrates that such an algorithm provides a robust
environment to test within, in the hope of successfully meeting challenges and/or
opportunities of the future.
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ENHANCING TRUST IN THE SMART GRID BY APPLYING A
MODIFIED EXPONENTIALLY WEIGHTED MOVING AVERAGES
ALGORITHM
1 Introduction
This chapter provides a general introduction of the thesis subject area in a general
way and an overview of the problem. The importance and motivation of the problem
addressed is also presented. Finally, this chapter outlines research goals and the structure
of research contained in this theses and also an overview of the remaining parts of the
thesis itself.
1.1 Overview
Identified as one of our nation’s critical resources [14], the electric power grid is vital
not only to the national security of the Unites States, but also its way of life. President
Obama astutely summarized a precautionary tale to those that take on today’s
technological challenges:
It’s the great irony of our Information Age–the very technologies that
empower us to create and to build also empower those who would disrupt and
destroy [45].
The electric power system falls under the broad umbrella of Industrial Control
Systems (ICS), and are managed through the use of Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) equipment and processes, with and it associated attributes, both
positive and negative. It is important not to frame any discussion on improving
1
performance and reliability of the electrical power system with these considerations in
mind, but to also ensure that security and robustness are key attributes, due to the critical
nature of this man-made resource.
1.2 Background
The commercial use of electricity began in the late 1870s when arc lamps were used
for lighthouse illumination and street lighting, and the first complete electric power
system (comprising a generator, cable, fuse, meter and loads) was built by Thomas Edison
in September 1882 [39]. Today, almost all of the utilities in the United States and Canada
are part of one very large and enormously complex interconnected system.
Complicating the issue is the fact that the electric power grid is not owned nor
managed by one single organization. Rather, it is the conglomeration of numerous
companies, usually regional in nature, interconnected to allow power to flow to your
home. Key to understanding the critical infrastructure issues associated with the electric
power grid is the ability frame the grid a one large information system. It is essential that
any modifications made to current systems account for emerging technologies, to allow
seamless integration now and and the future.
With smart grid technologies taunting new abilities such as energy management and
real-time pricing, there has been much recent discussion on what distribution systems of
the future can and should look like. That is why it is important to understand the
characteristics of the smart grid and how to frame accurately new challenges may be
associated with its implementation.
Integrated throughout this security challenge and modernization effort is governance
primarily at the federal level. The critical infrastructure discussion began in earnest root in
the late 1990’s, with initial reports to the President addressing security of the electric
power control networks and the electrical power grid [49]. The security of the nation’s
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Critical Infrastructure (CI) was thrusted into the forefront following the tragic events of
September 11th, 2001.
By 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) had tasked the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with specific responsibilities with regard
to the adoption of smart grid guidelines and standards [52]. Specific challenges that must
be addressed with any smart grid enhancements are identified in Section 2.3.
It is with the basic background identified in this section that this and related research
has built simulation environments to help ensure new technology development not only
addresses these concerns, but also meet evolving federal regulation standards. As
identified in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-63, President Clinton’s intent at the
time was that ”The United States will take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any
significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures,
including especially our cyber systems” [14]. The research conducted within this thesis,
enhancing the reliability of the electrical power grid’s special protection systems, is
certainly in alignment with the former President’s vision and should be in the mind of any
similar researcher. This high-level background helps frame the problem statement that this
research hopes to address.
1.3 Problem Statement
An incorrect decision made by a electric power grid Special Protection System
(SPS), also known as Special Protection Scheme, can have drastic consequences and
result in needless power service interruption. Current protection system methodology with
regard to load shedding do not accurately determine optimal loads for shedding.
Therefore, it is often the case that good (i.e., cooperating, non-malicious and/or
non-malfunctioning) nodes are incorrectly identified as untrusted and bad (i.e., not
cooperating, malicious and/or malfunctioning) nodes are incorrectly identified as trusted.
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1.4 Research Goals
The goal of this research is to develop a robust algorithm that will efficiently and
accurately calculate reputation based trust within electrical power grid special protection
systems, allowing the system to maintain an acceptable frequency level and accurately
classify good and bad nodes. The algorithm will be tunable to specific protection system
applications, adjusting for individual characteristics of each application, such as
associated background noise.
1.5 Contributions
Research contained in this thesis is driven by a novel approach to determining trust
within the electric power grid. Specifically, the creation and subsequent testing of a
unique algorithm to determine trust within an SPS promises to not only provide accurate
trust calculations, but minimize associated error.
1.6 Chapter Review
This chapter presented the research topic at a very high level, and the remainder of
this document is to fully document the research process of this thesis.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of literature that supports the research design and key
simulation parameters. This chapter also presents current research in the area.
Chapter 3 comprises the experimental methodology, to include goals and hypothesis,
testing environment and associated test cases and an overview of how results gathered
with be analyzed. It is within this chapter that the proposed algorithm is presented.
Chapter 4 reports the results from applying the design identified in Chapter 3. Both
observational and interpretive analysis techniques are used to convey a clear
understanding of the impact of this research.
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Chapter 5 identifies conclusions and recommendations for future research in this
topic area. The conclusions assert whether or not results from this research warrant
additional consideration and or immediate implementation. Throughout the course of this
research, numerous ideas presented themselves as promising research leads, but were
simply outside the scope of this thesis. Chapter 5 presents these ideas and frames their




This chapter provides brief introductory material, as well as a review of literature,
concepts and current research revelent to the protection of critical infrastructures, the
nation’s electric power system and the components of associated Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) management systems. Additionally, challenges associated
with emerging smart grid technologies and their implementation are presented. Then, an
overview of Special Protection Systems (SPS)s, also known as Special Protection
Schemes, and current research related to that topic area is addressed. This chapter
concludes with a look at traditional Exponentially Weighted Moving Averages (EWMA)
implementations and its direct applicability to an SPS.
Integral to this research is governance pertaining to these topic areas, as regulation
and oversight guide not only the future of the electric power grid, but also mandate
constraints in which evolutions to this topic area must adhere. Therefore, the literature
review contained herein begins with an overview of how the electrical power grid fits the
definition of Critical Infrastructure (CI) and a survey of relevant governance.
2.2 Critical Infrastructure
All characteristics of the US electric power system, including vulnerabilities, have
garnered much deserved attention over recent years, as the system itself clearly falls into
the category of critical infrastructure. On July 15, 1996, President Clinton signed
Executive Order 13010 establishing the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection [13]. This Executive Order (EO) defined ”infrastructure” as:
The framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising
identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and
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distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services
essential to the defense of government at all levels, and society as a whole.
Table 2.1: Eight Critical Infrastructures According to E.O. 13010 [13]
No. Government Sector(s)
1. Telecommunications
2. Electrical Power Systems
3. Gas and Oil Storage and Transportation
4. Banking and Finance
5. Transportation
6. Water Supply Systems
7. Emergency Services
8. Continuity of Government
E.O. 13010 broadened the list of critical infrastructure sectors to include electrical
power system by name as identified in Table 2.1. In 1998, President Clinton continued the
evolution of the term critical infrastructure to include those physical and cyber-based
systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They
include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance,
transportation, water systems and emergency services, both governmental and private[14].
Additionally, President Clinton expressly acknowledged that ”Many of the nation’s
critical infrastructures have historically been physically and logically separate systems
that had little interdependence”.
In a 1996 study, it was determined that over 90 percent of the nation’s critical
infrastructures were privately owned and operated [34]. This privatization certainly
extends to both SCADA systems, and specifically the US electrical power systems.
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Therefore, it should be no surprise that there is a wealth of governance guiding the power
grid’s security and modernization. Of specifc interest to this research is governance
pertaining to these topic areas, as regulation and oversight guide not only the future of the
electric power grid, but also mandate constraints in which evolutions to this topic area
must adhere. It is within this context that governance is reviewed.
2.3 Governance
In March 1997, the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
(NSTAC) issued a report to the President that assessed the security of the electric power
control networks and electric power grid. The report warned of utilities rapidly expanding
their use of information systems and interconnecting previously isolated networks because
of competition, aging proprietary systems, and reductions in staff and operating margins
[49].
Although Commission identified electronic intrusion of the utilities’ information
systems and networks as an emerging threat, it found that the industry considered the
primary threat to information systems to be from insiders. Even though the industry at the
time focused much of its attention toward the ever-present insider threat, the NSTAC made
the determination that substations presented the most significant information security
vulnerability in the power grid due in part to the vulnerabilities associated with
widespread use of dial-up modems and the use of public networks.
In early 2001, the NSTAC Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Task Force
consolidated detailed research and analysis done over recent years, and also requested
industry advice and recommendations for revision of the National Plan, in order to provide
sound recommendations to the President [50]. They framed the problem very well when
they stated, ”While Government is focusing on protecting national security, preventing
future attacks, and identifying and punishing attackers, private owners of infrastructures
are more concerned with common business imperatives. As a result of this dichotomy, any
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solution to, or recommendation for, the protection of critical infrastructures require the
participation of private industry in concert with the Government.
By 2007, the electric industry’s increased incorporation of Information Technology
(IT) systems as part of the smart grid effort now garnered congressional concern.
evaluating the growing concern that smart grid efforts, if not implemented securely, could
cause the electric grid to become more vulnerable to attacks and loss of services.
As a result, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) provided the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) with specific responsibilities with regard to coordinating the
development and adoption of smart grid guidelines and standards.
As the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of the United States Congress, the
Government Accounting Office was asked to[52]:
1. Assess the extent to which NIST has developed smart grid cybersecurity guidelines
2. Evaluate FERC’s approach for adopting and monitoring smart grid cybersecurity
and other standards
3. Identify challenges associated with smart grid cybersecurity
With respect to smart grid systems, GAO identified the six key challenges identified
in Table 2.2. To address these challenges, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology developed and issued a first version of its smart grid cyberspace guidelines in
August of 2010. The agency developed the guidelines for entities such as electric
companies involved in implementing smart grids[52]. It is important to note that as the
transition to smart grid technologies advances, smart grid data availability places
considerably more stringent demands on the communication and control system than
traditional SCADA systems do [36]. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the
underlying legacy SCADA systems, their current usage in the operation of the electric
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Table 2.2: GAO-Identified Challenges to Securing Smart Grid Systems [52]
No. Specific Challenge
1. Aspects of the regulatory environment may make it difficult to
ensure smart grid systems cybersecurity
2. The electric industry does not have an effective mechanism for
sharing information on cybersecurity
3. Utilities are focusing on regulatory compliance instead of
comprehensive security
4. Consumers are not adequately informed about the benefits,
costs, and risks associated with smart grid systems
5. There is a lack of security features being built into certain
smart grid systems
6. The electricity industry does not have metrics for evaluating
cybersecurity
power system and consideration that must be made when attempting to make
modifications.
2.4 SCADA
Industrial Control Systems, such as electric power generation plants, are large,
distributed complexes, requiring plant operators to continuously monitor and control
many different sections of the plant to ensure its proper operation [34]. This monitoring is
accomplished through the use of SCADA systems.
2.4.1 Overview. SCADA is short for Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition,
and as the implies, the focus of SCADA is on the supervisory level of operation. It is
generally used to control dispersed assets using centralized data acquisition and
supervisory controls[34]. As such, it is a purely software package that is positioned on top
of hardware to which it is interfaced, in general via Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLC), or other commercial hardware modules [18]. Initially, ICSs had little resemblance
to traditional IT systems in that ICSs were isolated systems running proprietary control
protocols using specialized hardware and software [34]. SCADA is pervasive in the
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generation and distribution of energy with each utility and cooperative having its own
SCADA system [23].
2.4.2 Architecture. A SCADA system is identified by to two basic layers: the
”client layer” which enables the man machine interface and the ”data server layer” which
is responsible for the majority of process data control activities [18].
The SCADA master station consists of the SCADA master servers and the Human
Machine Interface (HMI). The master station is located in a central control center from
where operators can monitor the entire system. SCADA master servers run the server-side
applications that communicate with the Remote Terminal Unit (RTU). The SCADA
master servers poll the RTUs for data and send control messages to supervise and control
the utility’s physical infrastructure. Backup servers are used to increase fault-tolerance of
the system [24].
Data servers communicate with devices in the field through PLCs. PLCs are
connected to the data servers either directly or via networks or field buses that are
proprietary (exempli gratia (e.g.) Siemens H1), or non-proprietary (e.g. Profibus) [18] The
data servers are responsible for data acquisition and handling (e.g. polling controllers,
alarm checking, calculations, logging and archiving) on a set of parameters. This pulling
of data from remote locations permits operators to monitor and control remote assets and
processes in real time.
2.4.3 Operation. To provide real-time data updates from the field, a SCADA
system needs remote sensory and communications capabilities. Electronic devices called
RTUs are located at each point where measurements are to be taken or where process
equipment is to be controlled. The central computer continuously polls the field-based
RTU to fetch their current measurement message containing updated values, and repeating
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that operation with subsequent RTUs, until all have been processed. That sequence is then
repeated over and over, without end [58].
2.4.4 Threats and Vulnerabilities. There are numerous sources and motivations
for disruption within a SCADA system as identified in Table 2.3
Table 2.3: Sources and Motivations for Utility Disruptions and Attack [28]
Source Reason




Destruction, terror or activism
Vendor compromise Easier to target the supplier than the defended
infrastructure itself [26]
Technical design error or
environmental influence
Hardware or code; network design, installation
and configuration; or interferences from other
technologies in the environment
Natural disasters Earthquakes, tornadoes, volcanoes, fires, thunder-
storms and snow storms
Operator error Misjudgement, misconfiguration, or failure to re-
member operational details, resulting in dangerous
or costly results
Additionally, there have been many real-world incidents affecting SCADA systems,
and many others never publicized, that clearly illustrate vulnerabilities [26] [16]:
• During the Cold War, the U.S. provided Trojan firmware to the Soviet Union,
causing a pipeline to explode in one of the world’s largest non-nuclear explosions
[26].
• In 2000, a disgruntled employee rigged a computerized control system at a water
treatment plant in Australia, releasing more than 200,000 gallons of sewage into
parks, rivers and the grounds of a Hyatt hotel [25]
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• In 2001, hackers hacked CAL-ISO, Californias primary power grid operator, and
were not discovered for 17 days [11]
• In 2003, the Slammer Worm took Ohios Davis-Besse nuclear plant safety monitor
oﬄine for five hours [26]
• In 2008, a senior Central Intelligence Agency official, Tom Donahue, told a meeting
of utility company representatives in New Orleans that a cyberattack had taken out
power equipment in multiple regions outside the U.S. Mr. Donahue stated that the
outage was followed with extortion demands [25]
Cyber attacks on U.S. SCADA networks have the potential to affect supplies of
gasoline, electricity or water, ultimately impacting stock prices on a global level [16]. It is
now clear that SCADA system in general, and the electric power system specifically, has
numerous vulnerabilities and protecting it warrants additional consideration. Therefore,
reviewed of power production and distribution system on the U.S. power grid is
warranted.
2.5 Electrical Power Generation
Continuous control of electric power generation to match changes in load has been a
standing problem which has attracted the attention of the workers and researchers of
power operation and control [8]. This is due to the fact that unpredictable changes in load
frequently cause power generation-consumption mismatches, adversely affecting the
quality of generated power due to the offsetting of the desired frequency value.
2.5.1 Characteristics. Although distribution circuits come in many different
configurations and circuit lengths, most share many common characteristics as identified
in Figure 2.1. These components include the generation station, generating step up
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Electrical energy is produced by a generating station. This electrical energy is 
up-converted to a high voltage value by a step-up transformer located at the transmission 
substation. This high voltage value minimizes power losses in transmission of electrical energy 
over long distances. High voltage energy is transferred from the transmission substation to power 
substations by high voltage transmission lines. A step-down transformer located at the power 
substation down converts the received voltage to a lower value, normally a few thousand volts. 
Distribution lines carry the voltage energy from the power substation to the customers. At the 
customer’s location, a power step-down transformer converts the voltage energy to 120 volts and 
240 volts before it enters the consumer’s home or office. This process is a very simplified view 
of a power production and distribution system based on the information found in [1] and [50]. 
Multiple SCADA sensors and actuators are located throughout the system to monitor and control 
power generation and distribution. The SCADA system controls the amount of power generated 
to meet user demands, while insuring the power distribution system is not overloaded. 
 
Figure 5. Power Production and Distribution System image by J. Messerly [1] 
Figure 5 is a very simplified view of the power production and distribution system, which 
does not consider line or component loss due to resistance or multiple paths from sources to 
sinks. 
Transmission lines  
765, 500, 345, 230, and 138 kV 
Transmission Customer 











Blue:  Transmission Subtransmission Customer 
26kV and 69kV 
Primary Customer 
13kV and 4kV 
Secondary Customer 
120V and 240V 
Figure 2.1: Power Production and Distribution System [42]
2.5.2 Operation. Deviation of frequency from its nominal value should be
minimized and kept within rigid limits in order for electric power consuming and
frequency dependent control equipment to operate satisfactorily [8]. Additionally, turbines
used for power production are designed to operate at specific frequencies and incur stress
related damage when operating at higher or lower frequencies. Manufacturers often
provide abnormal operating characteristics, recognizing that each generation device will
have its own unique limits. Figure 2.2 illustrates the operational limits of a representative
steam turbine with the following characteristics as measured in Hertz (Hz) [8]:
• The areas between 59.5 Hz and 60.5 Hz are areas of unrestricted time operating
frequency limits
• Operation between 58.5 Hz and 57.9 Hz is permitted for ten minutes before turbine
blade damage is probable
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If a unit operates within this frequency band for one minute, then nine more
minutes of operation within this band are permitted over the life of the blade [7]
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underfrequency relays typically trip if a generator falls below 57.5 Hz for more than 10 
seconds or trip instantly if the frequency drops below 56.0 Hz.  In order to prevent a 
generator from tripping off on underfrequency relays or from operating at lower than 
normal frequencies for extended periods, SPSs employ load shedding schemes to reduce 
the loads on the generators.  Figure 1 illustrates the typical operating frequency 
limitations for steam turbines. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Steam Turbine Partial or Full Load Operating Limitations During Abnormal 

























Figure 2.2: Steam Turbine Partial or Full Load Operating Limitations During Abnormal
Frequency [1]
With regard to operational limits, it is important to remember that time spent in a
given frequency band is cumulative and, for preventative maintenance purposes, is usually
considered independent of the time accumulated in any other band. Since fatigue life is
used up during abnormal underfrequency operation, the time spent in an underfrequency
event should be minimized as much as possible. It is with these operational limit
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considerations in mind that several researchers have created a minimum acceptable
frequency of 58.8 Hz [32] [21] [54], as operating below this frequency threshold could
result in unwanted damage to internal components.
With smart grid technologies taunting new abilities such as energy management and
real-time pricing, there has been much recent discussion on what distribution systems of
the future can and should look like. It is important to understand the characteristics of the
smart grid, in order to develop an approach that is robust enough to apply in today’s
environment as well as integrate seamlessly into the smart grid to take advantage of the
opportunities it purports.
2.6 Smart Grid
The power utility industry has been utilizing advances in communication and IT over
the years in order to improve efficiency, reliability, security and quality of service [47].
Momentum for the smart grid vision has increased recently due to policy and regulatory
initiatives [17] [63].
The smart grid is envisioned to take advantage of all available modern technologies
in transforming the current electrical grid into one that functions more intelligently. There
are numerous potential benefits that smart grid technology is expected to facilitate,
including:
• Displacement of about half of our nation’s net oil imports [37]
• Better situational awareness and operator assistance [47]
• Reduction in U.S. carbon dioxide emissions by about 25 percent [37]
• Integration of renewable resources including solar, wind, and various types of
energy storage [47]
• Reductions in emissions of urban air pollutants of 40 percent to 90 percent [37]
There are several newly developed and/or tailored smart grid attributes to help the
nation achieve these advertised benefits.
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2.6.1 Attributes. The first such attribute that must be understood is demand
response. Demand response allows consumer load reduction in response to emergency
and high-price conditions on the electricity grid [59]. Such conditions are more prevalent
during peak load or congested operation.
The second relevant attribute of smart grid technology is its implementation of load
rejection. Load rejection as an emergency resource to protect the grid from disruption is
well understood and is implemented to operate either by system operator or through
underfrequency and/or under-voltage relays [47]. The smart grid enhancement is that load
rejection schemes can be enhanced to act more intelligently and be based on customer
participation.
2.6.2 Threats and Vulnerabilities. Although threats of economic and industrial
sabotage have long existed, the international proliferation of the Internet makes cyber
economic and industrial sabotage an especially daunting and potentially
economy-crippling threat [41] [65].
As we can see, vulnerabilities have not gone away ( and maybe got worse).
Therefore, it is important to understand how to recover from a situation once it happens. It
will happen (cite instances).
Several other grid-related impacts are likely to emerge when adding a significant new
load for charging plug-in hybrid vehicles. Higher system loading could impact the overall
system reliability when the entire infrastructure is used near its maximum capability for
long periods [37].
”Over the past several years, we have seen cyber attacks against critical
infrastructures abroad, and many of our own infrastructures are as vulnerable as their
foreign counterparts,” Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair recently told
lawmakers. ”A number of nations, including Russia and China, can disrupt elements of
the U.S. information infrastructure [25]”. The growing reliance of utilities on
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Internet-based communication has increased the vulnerability of control systems to spies
and hackers, according to government reports.
It is not wise to imagine any internet-based communications to be completely secure
and free from attack. The U.S. electrical grid is no different. Instead, researchers and
developers must focus their resources and efforts to adapting to and overcoming such
malicious intrusions and even routine equipment malfunctions. One such mechanism that
is employed within the electric power systems is the Special Protection System (SPS)
(also known as Special Protection Scheme).
2.7 Special Protection System
A special protection system is specifically designed to detect abnormal system
conditions, preserve system stability and are designed to take pre-planned corrective
action in response to certain disturbances, to mitigate the consequence of abnormal
conditions [4][38][67]. These systems are often perceived as an attractive alternative to
constructing new transmission lines because they can be placed in service relatively
quickly and inexpensively.
In their most recent survey, CIGRE´, the Council on Large Electric Systems,
identified 113 special protection schemes in operation [66]. Additionally, the IEEE
CIRGE´ survey concurred with these results and identified generator rejection as the most
commonly used SPS [4]. The most common SPS types are consolidated in Table 2.4.
Related work in this field investigated the creation of a SPS that estimated load
shedding levels under transient situations by using communication from regional
generators and key loads [21][32][54]. This research will also focus on these aspects of an
SPS, as generation rejection and load shedding are the most common responses employed
by SPSs worldwide[3]. SPSs are designed to preserve system stability in the face of a
large variety of disturbances, helping to prevent violent and disastrous effects.
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Table 2.4: Percentages of Most Common SPS Types [3][66]
Types of SPS Percentage
Generator Rejection 21.6
Load Rejection 10.8
Underfrequency Load Shedding 8.2
System Separation 6.3
Turbine Valve Control 6.3








Combination of Schemes 11.7
Others 12.6
An example of such a disturbance is possible in systems that are interconnected by
long or weak tie lines, which may be heavily loaded. When this scenario occurs, the
power system may break apart in ways that are not predictable and possible create power
system islands having large generation-to-load imbalances. Islanding occurs when a
distributed generator (or group of distributed generators) continues to energize a portion
of the utility system that has been separated from the main utility system [6]. It is not
desirable for a distributed generator to island any part of the utility system as this can lead
to safety and power quality problems such as the generation-to-load imbalance previously
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addressed. Regardless of the specific implementation of an SPS, there are several traits in
common that each will posess.
2.7.1 Traits. Protective schemes have at least four traits in common [4] that are
pertinent to this research. First, all SPS implemetations are dynamic security control
systems and are designed to control power system stability in cases where the
uncontrolled response is likely to be more damaging than the controlled response.
Secondly, all are devised by off-line analysis, as opposed to on-line real-time control.
The reasons for this is that the power system response is too fast to allow for the usual
sequential control system logic, which might be summarized as:
• make the observations in real time
• determine the scope of the disturbance
• decide what action is required, and then
• take the needed action
Third, many of these schemes are armed or disarmed, as required, in order to meet
the needs of the system at a particular time. In other words, the special control logic may
not be required under certain operating conditions, in which case the SPS is disarmed.
Finally, all of the schemes provide a particular type of remedial action that is
designed to alleviate a certain observed system condition, or to take a predetermined
action when a certain event occurs whose resulting effects are calculated to be too serious
to ignore
Although the schemes have several traits in common, specific preplanned courses of
action must be determined and tailored through detailed stability studies. Therefore, it is
important to fully understand stability as it pertains to the power system.
2.7.2 Power System Stability. Power system stability may be broadly defined as
that property of a power system that enables it to remain in a state of operating
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equilibrium under normal operating conditions and to regain an acceptable state of
equilibrium after being subjected to a disturbance. Instability within of a power system
can be influenced by a wide range of factors and can take many different forms. Similarly,
there are numerous events that can introduce instability into a power system. Typical event
disturbances are identified below:
• Transmission faults
• Cascading outages of lines
• Generation outages
• Sudden, large load changes
• Combination of the above
There is much caution in the realm of power system stability, with numerous
reminders that solutions to stability problems of one category should not be at the expense
of another [39]. The basic operating requirements of an ac power system are that the
synchronous generators must remain in synchronism and the voltages must be kept close
to their rated values [51]. The capability of a power system to meet these requirements in
the face of possible disturbances (line faults, generator and line outages, load switchings,
et cetera (etc.)) is characterized by its transient, dynamic and voltage stability [55].
The simulations in this experiment have a great impact on the transient stability of
the power grid and is what will be measured throughout each experiment. Transient
stability is the ability of the power system to maintain synchronism when subjected to a
severe transient disturbance [39]. Power system stability depends greatly on both the
initial operating state and the severity of the disturbance. Although disturbances can vary
greatly, as previously identified in Section 2.7.2, the SPS is designed and operated so as to
be stable for a wide range of contingencies. Among the most common SPS types is load
shedding and generator rejection as depicted in Table 2.4.
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2.7.3 Generation Rejection Scheme. A Generator Rejection Scheme (GRS), when
properly operating, significantly improves response following a contingency [69]. A GRS
is designed to trip pre-selected generating unit(s) at a plant in order to prevent loss of the
entire plant. Utilizing generation rejection to attempt to regain system stability is not a
new approach. Quite to the contrary, generator rejection actually comprises the most
common type of special protection scheme, as identified in Table 2.4. The selective
tripping of generating units for severe transmission system contingencies has been used as
a method of improving system stability for many years [39]. The approach of generator
tripping as a stability aid was initially confined to hydro plants, but has gradually extended
to fossil-fuel-fired and nuclear units since the 1970s. Even with generation rejection
implemented, the creation of a load imbalance in a power system may cause such an
excess of load over generation that there is no alternative but to shed some of the load.
2.7.4 Underfrequency Load Shedding. In many cases, underfrequency conditions
arise due to the breakup of a large system into two or more islands. It is often necessary to
install load shedding relays throughout the power system so that any possible island
configuration will be protected against underfrequency operation.
An important aspect of load shedding is that it is necessary for all of the utilities that
make up the interconnected system to come to an agreement as to the amount and timing
of load shedding, so that all portions of the system behave in approximately the same
manner when load shedding is required, irrespective of the exact cut set that defines the
separation [3].
A desirable and obvious, yet not trivial, underlying requirement of load shedding is
the fact that a load should shed when called upon to do so. It is desirable is improve the
operation of load shedding by selecting only those loads that the system could trust to do
what is instructed of them in a time of need. Researchers are currently approaching this
facet of load shedding through the use of trust management [21][32][54].
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2.7.5 Trust Management. Although the idea of trust relates to firm beliefs in
attributes such as reliability, honesty and competence, it has proven a difficult topic to
research. This is primarily due to a lack of consensus in literature on the definition of trust
and exactly what constitutes trust management [2] [27] [46].
The definition of trust for the purposes of this research is [5]:
Trust is firm belief in the competence of an entity to act as expected, such that
this firm belief is not a fixed value associated with the entity, but rather it is
subject to the entitys behavior and applies only within a specific context at a
given time.
With regard to the power grid, the concept of trust management or a trust system is to
provide software agents that plug into an existing network, somewhat transparently, to
perform the functions of correlating data and identifying risk levels for corresponding
events and status updates to point to negative impacts on utility services. Researchers have
developed such trust systems that operate by intercepting messages or commands from
network nodes and validates input to identify security risks or bad data [15].
2.7.6 Reputation Based Trust. Most research on reputation based trust utilizes
information such as community-based feedbacks about past experiences of peers to help
make recommendations and judgements on quality and reliability of the applicable
transactions [68]. A challenge with any reputation based trust system is how to deal with
the malicious behaviors of peers, or malfunction that presents itself as such. For the
purpose of this research, a node displaying malicious or malfunctioning behavior is
identifies as bad.
Reputation based trust is a topic of much interest and research in recent years [2] [9]
[44], and each presents a manner to cope with such bad participants. The research in this
thesis, however, focuses specifically on the electric power system and addressing
challenges specific to it.
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Therefore, there are several researchers of keen interest, as they have effectively
demonstrated the application of reputation based trust within electrical power systems
[10] [20] [54]. Regardless of the specific SPS being utilized, taking correct action at the
correct time is key to success. This research determines the value of applying a concept to
an SPS that has not been yet been documented; namely modifying traditional
exponentially weighted moving average calculations. There is a push for modernization,
which is an ongoing process. While planning for the future, the effort must continue to
add security and reliability into the existing SCADA electric utility equipment. Adding a
reputation based trust system that can be optimized for each application not only adds
reliability now, but also provides a vehicle to add new enhancements directly into the
smart grid as it grows and evolves.
2.7.7 Special Protection System Trust Module. The specific trust implementation
in this research is an adaptation of existing research and has three major components; a
trust assignment component, a fault detection component and a decision component [21]:
1. The trust assignment component uses context sensitive information and
periodic intercommunication messages to determine individual smart
grid protection components’ trust values. The context sensitive
information shared by smart grid protection components are generator
frequencies, which is used to reach a consensus concerning the state of
the system. Protection components in agreement with the consensus are
assigned a high trust value and those whom disagree are assigned a low
trust value.
2. The fault detection component monitors one or more predetermined
values for changes that indicate a condition requiring corrective action,
namely grid frequencies measured at all generator and load locations.
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The decision component is notified when a monitored value exceeds or
falls below it predetermined limits.
3. The decision component uses the previously assigned trust values to
validate the detected fault and responds appropriately to minimize power
grid downtime.
To dynamically determine the appropriate corrective action, the referenced trust
module utilizes a greedy algorithm approach.
2.7.8 Greedy Sorting Algorithm. The greedy sorting algorithm is used by the trust
management module to determine the order in which the protection system nodes are
selected for load shedding, by using assigned trust values, node type and load values. In
this manner, the trust module sorts all protection system nodes. Table 2.5 is an example
set of sorted nodes with precedence from left to right, i.e., first sort by Type (type of node)
and then by Trust Value (nodes calculated trust value) followed by Load in Megawatts
(MW) (load amount at the node, customer authorized load shed amount (20% of load
amount in this example) and the node’s Identification Number (ID) [21].








Load High 1812 362 120
Load High 1492 298 73
Load High 1492 298 25
Load High 1250 250 72
Load Low 1590 318 33
Load Low 1492 298 82
If a frequency disturbance is detected and requires the power grid to shed 700 MW of
power, then the greedy algorithm would attempt to meet this requirement by selecting the
first load node in Table 2.5, namely node 120 [21]. Since the selection of this node is not
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enough to meet the 700 MW of power required to shed, the greedy algorithm selects the
next node, in this case node 73. This process must continue one more round to include
node 25, ensuring that the shed amount is great than or equal to 700 MW. Now the
selected node have enough load available for shedding (i.e., 958 MW) to meet the
requirement–enabling the greedy algorithm to stop selecting additional nodes for load
shedding [20].
It is important that if the greedy algorithm exhausts all load nodes from Table 2.5
with a trust value identified as High before it reaches the required load shed amount, it
then selects Low trust values until the required amount is met. Since the untrusted nodes
are not expected to follow the shed request, the system often fails to maintain the required
frequency threshold.
A second topic of interest is the specific determination of High and/or Low trust
values. Related research determines this binary value in a number of different manners
[10] [21] [54]. One option is to simply apply a trust threshold to the final observation. For
example, if the final frequency observed before the trust determination is made is within
tolerance, then the node would be trusted. If not within tolerance, then the corresponding
trust value for that time step would be Low, and would be the nodes overall trust value if
the trust determination is made during that time step. This aligns with the notion of a
traditional EWMA implementation with a lambda (λ) = 1, as discussed in Section 2.8.3.
Other trust management researchers have included a history and chose to equally
weight each of the trust value observations made for a specified period of time. This
concept equally weighs all past observations and corresponds to a traditional EWMA
implementation with a λ = 0, also discussed in Section 2.8.3.
2.8 Exponentially Weighted Moving Averages
Several approaches have been taken to determine the best application of trust [10]
[21] [54]. These approaches implement a variety of the SPS protection tools availably in
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Table 2.4. It is the asserataion of this research that an EWMA is applicable to help
determine the trust value within a reputation based trust SPS implementation.
2.8.1 Overview. The EWMA concepts were first introduced in 1959 [53].
Although the EWMA is known to have optimal properties in some forecasting and control
applications [12] [48], it has largely been neglected as a tool by quality-control analysts
[43].
An exponentially weighted moving average is a means of smoothing random
fluctuations that has the following desirable properties [30]:
1. Declining weight is put on older data
2. It is extremely easy to compute
3. Minimum data is required
Observations are assumed to be sequentially recorded and these observations, or
some functions thereof, are usually plotted for the purpose of controlling a manufacturing
process. Additionally, the desire to employ historical data more resourcefully has
occasionally led to the notion of the moving average [33]. For example, a plot of a moving
average of k = 8 observations will only display the average of the eight most recent
observations. This is a first-in-first-out implementation, where newer data forces the older
data out of the computation.
2.8.2 Sample Calculations. Traditional EWMA implementations give less and
less weight to data as they get older and older. A new value is easily obtained by
computing a weighted average of two variables, namely the value of the average of the
previous period and the current value of the variable.
A simply application of an EWMA is presented in as Equation 2.1 [30], which
follows the rule: take a weighted average of all past observations and use this as your
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forecast of the present mean of the distribution.
S t = B[S t + AS t−1 + A2S t−2 + A3S t−3 + A4S t−4 + ...] (2.1)
where B is a constant between 0 and 1, A is (1 - B), the Ss are observations of the variable
and the t subscript indicates the time ordering of the observations. S t is the estimate of the
expected value of the distribution.
2.8.3 Traditional EWMA Example. This thesis research is based upon a variation
of the traditional application of EWMA [43], based on the statistic identified in Equation
2.2, which presents the symbol Zi.
Zi = λYi + (1 − λ)Zi−1, 0 < λ ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, ..., n (2.2)
where
• Z0 is the mean of the historical data
• Yi is the observation at time i
• N is the number of n observations to be monitored
The starting value Z0 is often realized as the target value of the monitored process
[56]. This approach is necessary there is no target value of the process being monitored.
Utilize Equation 2.3 to simply determine the average:





Yi, i = 1, 2, ..., n (2.3)
Additionally, the sequentially recorded observations, Yi, are individually observed
values from the process.
TRADITIONAL EWMA EXAMPLE:
The given a data set, Y, has 8 observations, so N = 8:
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Y = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0}.
Next calculate Z0, which in this case is equal to Y ,
Which is Z0 = Y = 18 {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0} = 0.75.
Implementing Equation 2.2 with λ = 0.6 yields the following initial Zi values:
Z0 = 0.75
Z1 = λY1 + (1 − λ)Z0 = 0.6 × 1 + (1 − 0.4) × 0.75 = 0.9000
Z2 = λY2 + (1 − λ)Z1 = 0.6 × 1 + (1 − 0.4) × 0.9000 = 0.9600
Following the same rules, all the Zn values are presented in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Intermediate Calculations of a Traditional EWMA Algorithm [43]
Z0 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8
0.75 0.9000 0.9600 0.9840 0.9936 0.9974 0.9990 0.3996 0.1598
Figure 3.1 captures the resulting EWMA chart for data set Y. It is important to note
that although only the last two observations from Y were 0’s, the final EWMA is 0.1598,
which is due to the fact a traditional EWMA property is that declining weight is placed
older data, given 0 < λ ≤ 1.
To better understand the role λ has in the creation of Figure 3.1, where the final
calculated average is 0.1598, consider the cases where λ is equal to 0 and the case where it
is equal to 1. λ = 0 is essentially giving equal weight to all observations, which is equal to
the average, of 0.75 in this case. Conversely, λ = 1 only gives weight to the most recent
observation, yielding a calculated average of 0, as this is the final value in data set Y .
Therefore, given data set Y , the resultant value given a λ of 0, 0.6 and 1.0 yields
calculated averages of 0, 0.1598 and 0.75 respectively. If applied to a trust scheme, data
set Y may be trusted on some occasions and not trusted on others, depending on the value
of λ and also the trust threshold. Selecting appropriate λ and trust thresholds are key to



























Traditional EWMA Calculations  
λ = 0.6 
Final Value of 0.1598  
Figure 2.3: Traditional EWMA Graph on Data Set Y , with λ = 0.6
2.8.4 SPS Applicability. In the case of an SPS incorporating reputation based
trust, there is no target value for Z0. This is due to the fact that a particular node may be
either good or bad (malicious or malfunctioning). Therefore, although the minimum
acceptable frequency for normal operation may be 58.8 Hz, initializing Z0 to this value
could create a situation where bad nodes are not detected.
The overall goal of the SPS is like many industrial processes, where the goal is to
maintain a stable state or in this case frequency. This is not the case, however, for the
reputation based trust management implementation, where the goal is to accurately reflect
trustworthiness of each node regardless of whether it is behaving good or bad.
Lastly, due to the complexities associated with SPS implementation, the traditional
EWMA implementation cannot be directly applied. In this thesis, several changes are
made to the algorithm described by Equation 2.2 before it is applied to any trust
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management. Specific changes to the algorithm along with detailed testing methodology




Thorough and rigorous testing is important to validate assumptions and determine
causality. The goal of creating the simulation environment in this thesis is not to
necessarily optimize individual run-time environment components. Rather, the goal for
utilizing this particular experimental environment is to create an environment that is
conducive to robust reputation based trust testing. Finally, the role of statistics in the
scientific method cannot be overstated.
The discipline of ”statistics” can be described as the art and science of using
quantitative information (data) to gain understanding and to make informed decisions
[40]. Therefore, the methodology in this thesis was designed to facilitate the condensing
of large volumes of data into forms that facilitate understanding.
Special protection systems are evaluated in terms of its ability to take correct actions
during disruptions within electrical systems such as those identified in Table 2.3. The
overall goal of these protective systems is quite simply to preserve system stability.
This research methodology explores the applicability of a proposed special protection
system that calculates reputation based trust based upon a modified Exponentially
Weighted Moving Averages (EWMA) algorithm developed within this research. To
accomplish this, the research methodology is divided into stages that facilitate data
collection and analysis.
3.2 Modified Exponentially Weighted Moving Average
Due to the properties of a special protection scheme, namely that it is called after a
catastrophic failure is observed, direct application of the traditional exponentially
weighted moving average equation, Equation 2.2, is not possible. This research assumes
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that during normal operation, applicable system measurements and their resultant trust
values are consistent and accurate. Then when a special protection condition arises, the
stability of the system is jeopardized, as discussed in Section 2.7.2. Therefore, the
traditional EWMA property that declining weight is put on older data simply will not
suffice.
This research explores the application of reputation based trust that implements a
modified EWMA scheme. If implemented correctly, the protection system will correctly
react to the disturbance before the system reaches the minimum frequency threshold of
58.8 Hz, while minimizing both false positives and false negatives.
Due to the instability induced by the event requiring the special protection system
action, older data should have more weight than the newer data collected during periods
of instability. Therefore, critical modifications must be made to the traditional EWMA
algorithm to accurately account for the properties surrounding SPS implementation.
Equation 2.2 identified the traditional EWMA algorithm:
Zi = λYi + (1 − λ)Zi−1, 0 < λ ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, ..., n
Within this research, consensus information as identified in Section 2.7.8, is treated
as intermediary trust values. Therefore, instead of making trust decisions on data set Y
directly, as occurred in the traditional EWMA calculations in Section 2.8.2, data set Y is
now viewed as a set of a intermediary trust value. The modified algorithm is applied to
data set Y to determine the actual trust values.
When applied to data set Y = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0} with a λ = 0.6, the resultant
calculation, or trust value in this case is 0.1598 as identified in Table 2.6. This research
attests that the final two 0′s in data set Y are not indicative of an untrustworthy condition,
but rather should be expected during an SPS condition.
To correct for this SPS property, it is important to traverse the data set backward, or
from most recent to oldest and give the most weight to older data. To accomplish this
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result, Equations 2.3 and 2.2 must be modified to become Equations 3.1 and 3.2
respectively:






Zˆ j = λY j + (1 − λ)Zˆ j+1, 0 < λ ≤ 1, j = n, n − 1, ..., 1 (3.2)
where
• ZˆN+1 is the mean of the historical data
• Y j is the observation at time j
• N is the number of n observations to be monitored
• Zˆ j is the modified EWMA algorithm
These new equations allow for revised trust calculations from those realized in
Section 2.8.3.
MODIFIED EWMA EXAMPLE:
Once again, the given a data set, Y, has 8 observations, so N = 8:
Y = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0}.
Next calculate ZˆN+1, which is equal to Y = Zˆ9, since N = 8.
Which is ZˆN+1 = Zˆ9 = Y = 18 {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0} = 0.75.
Implementing Equation 3.2 with λ = 0.6 yields the following initial Zˆ j values:
Zˆ9 = 0.75
Zˆ8 = λY8 + (1 − λ)Zˆ9 = 0.6 × 0 + (1 − 0.4) × 0.75 = 0.3000
Zˆ7 = λY7 + (1 − λ)Zˆ8 = 0.6 × 0 + (1 − 0.4) × 0.3000 = 0.1200
Zˆ6 = λY6 + (1 − λ)Zˆ7 = 0.6 × 1 + (1 − 0.4) × 0.1200 = 0.6480


























Modified EWMA Calculations  
λ = 0.6 
Final Value of 0.9964  
Figure 3.1: Modified EWMA Graph on Data Set Y , with λ = 0.6
Table 3.1: Intermediate Calculations of Modified EWMA Algorithm
Zˆ1 Zˆ2 Zˆ3 Zˆ4 Zˆ5 Zˆ6 Zˆ7 Zˆ8 Zˆ9
0.9964 0.9910 0.9775 0.9437 0.8592 0.6480 0.1200 0.3000 0.7500
Figure 3.1 captures the resulting EWMA chart for data set Y . It is important to note
that this revised algorithm generates a markedly different result than the traditional
implementation in Section 2.8.3, resulting in a final EWMA (trust calculation) of 0.9964.
Since declining is placed on more recent data, the final two values of data set Y , which are
both 0′s, the resulting calculation is quite high. This final value would be considered
trusted given any threshold trust below 0.9964. Critical to this research is implementation
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of this modified exponentially weight moving averages algorithm to determine optimal λ
and trust threshold values, as determined using techniques in Section 3.2.1.
3.2.1 Analysis. Receiver operating characteristics graphs have long been used in
signal detection theory to depict the tradeoff between hit rates and false alarm rates of



















Figure 3.2: Confusion Martix [22]
Labeled in Figure 3.2 are the four possible outcomes of a given classifier and
instance. If the instance is positive and classified as positive, it is counted as a True
Positive (TP); if it is classified as negative, it is counted as a False Negative (FN).
Similarly, if the instance is negative and it is classified as negative, it is counted as a True
Negative (TN); if it is classified as positive, it is counted as a False Positive (FP). Given a
classifier and a set of instances, (the test set), a two-by-two confusion matrix can be
constructed representing the dispositions of the set of instances [22].
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Two additional performance metrics must be identified to construct ROC curves,
namely the True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) as identified in
Equations 3.3 and 3.4 [29].
TruePositiveRate (T PR) =
T P




FP + T N
(3.4)
ROC curves are comprised of single points comprised of (FP rate, TP rate) pairs,
known as discrete classifiers [22], as depicted in Figure 3.3.
the actual class and the predicted class we use the labels
{Y,N} for the class predictions produced by a model.
Given a classiﬁer and an instance, there are four possible
outcomes. If the instance is positive and it is classiﬁed as
positive, it is counted as a true positive; if it is classiﬁed
as negative, it is counted as a false negative. If the instance
is negative and it is classiﬁed as negative, it is counted as a
true negative; if it is classiﬁed as positive, it is counted as a
false positive. Given a classiﬁer and a set of instances (the
test set), a two-by-two confusion matrix (also called a con-
tingency table) can be constructed representing the disposi-
tions of the set of instances. This matrix forms the basis for
many common metrics.
Fig. 1 shows a confusion matrix and equations of several
common metrics that can be calculated from it. The num-
bers along the major diagonal represent the correct deci-
sions made, and the numbers of this diagonal represent
the errors—the confusion—between the various classes.
The true positive rate1 (also called hit rate and recall) of a
classiﬁer is estimated as
tp rate  Positives correctly classified
Total positives
The false positive rate (also called false alarm rate) of the
classiﬁer is
fp rate  Negatives incorrectly classified
Total negatives
Additional terms associated with ROC curves are
sensitivity ¼ recall
specificity ¼ True negatives
False positives þ True negatives
¼ 1 fp rate
positive predictive value ¼ precision
3. ROC space
ROC graphs are two-dimensional graphs in which tp
rate is plotted on the Y axis and fp rate is plotted on the
X axis. An ROC graph depicts relative tradeoﬀs between
beneﬁts (true positives) and costs (false positives). Fig. 2
shows an ROC graph with ﬁve classiﬁers labeled A through
E.
A discrete classiﬁer is one that outputs only a class label.
Each discrete classiﬁer produces an (fp rate, tp rate) pair
corresponding to a single point in ROC space. The classiﬁ-
ers in Fig. 2 are all discrete classiﬁers.
Several points in ROC space are important to note. The
lower left point (0,0) represents the strategy of never issu-
ing a positive classiﬁcation; such a classiﬁer commits no
false positive errors but also gains no true positives. The
opposite strategy, of unconditionally issuing positive classi-
ﬁcations, is represented by the upper right point (1,1).
The point (0,1) represents perfect classiﬁcation. Ds per-
formance is perfect as shown.
Informally, one point in ROC space is better than
another if it is to the northwest (tp rate is higher, fp rate
is lower, or both) of the ﬁrst. Classiﬁers appearing on the
















Fig. 1. Confusion matrix and common performance metrics calculated from it.
1 For clarity, counts such as TP and FP will be denoted with upper-case
letters and rates such as tp rate will be denoted with lower-case.





















Fig. 2. A basic ROC graph showing ﬁve discrete classiﬁers.
862 T. Fawcett / Pattern Recognition Letters 27 (2006) 861–874
Figure 3.3: Basic ROC Graph Showing Five Discrete Classifiers [22]
The lower left point (0,0) represents a strategy that commits no false positives, but
also no true positives. The opposite strategy would be depicted by a point in the the upper
right (1,1). Unfortunately, this strategy unconditionally issues both true and false positives.
Informally, one point in ROC space is better than another if it is to the nort;hwest (TP rate
is higher, FP rate is lower, or both) of the first [22]. Finally, the diagonal line y = x
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represents a strategy of randomly guessing a class. With regard to the points plotted in
Figure 3.3, D would be the optimal strategy of the discrete classifiers available, as it serves
to both maximize true positives and minimize false positives. Research in this thesis will
consider a classifier optimal if it accomplishes both of these objectives as well.
3.3 Testing Environment
The research contained in this thesis makes use primarily of the EPOCHS Simulation
Environment, PSS/E electromechanical transient simulator and NS2 network simulator.
3.3.1 EPOCHS Simulation Environment. EPOCHS is a simulation platform that
integrates multiple research and Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) systems to bridge the
gap [32]. It allows users to investigate electromechanical scenarios using PSS/E and NS2.
The focus of EPOCHS is to integrate power and network communication simulators so
















Figure 3.4: Relationship Between EPOCHS Components
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3.3.2 Network Simulator 2. Network Simulator (Version 2), widely known as
NS2, is an event-driven simulation tool that is useful in studying the dynamic nature of
communication networks and has gained popularity in the networking research
community since its birth in 1989 [35]. As identified in 3.5, NS2 takes in the name of a

















Figure 3.5: NS2 Architecture [35]
Figure 3.6 provides a representation of smart grid implementation that NS2 attempts
to accurately model. Specifically, there are several different types of nodes that are
interconnected such as customers, substations power plants and control centers. Within
NS2 each of these node types is represented by a software agent, where software agents
are autonomous software entities designed to mimic the behavior of real world systems,
and each would be strategically located within Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) in a
real world environment [21].




corresponding power simulator component via EPOCHS [68], see Figure 27. Each 
software agent represents a single power simulator component, such as a load bus in 
PSS/E [65] or a power bus in PSCAD [66]. Each software agent can access and modify 
their corresponding power component’s data (e.g., access sensor data, engage relays, 
change load power levels, etc). The software agents’ capabilities enable seamless 
integration of the trust management toolkit modules with a simulated smart grid enhanced 
power grid. 
 
Figure 26. Abstract representation of a smart grid wide area network [68] 
 




































Figure 3.6: Representation of a Smart Grid Wide Area Network [32]
3.3.3 PSS/E. PSS/E is the premier software tool used by electrical transmission
participants world-wide. Since its inception in 1976, it has become the most
comprehensive, technically advanced, and widely used commercial program of its type
[60]. Software agents communicate with PSS/E through the EPOCHS environment, as
depicted in Figure 3.4. As such, each software agent can access and modify their
corresponding power component’s data (e.g., access sensor data, engage relays, change
load power levels, etc.), ensuring seamless integration of proposed the trust management
enabled exponentially weighted moving averages algorithm capability into a simulated
smart grid enhanced power grid.
3.3.4 AgentHQ. AgentHQ presents a unified environment to agents and acts as a
proxy when agents interact with other EPOCHS components.
In order to support the operation of software agents on the power grid, a
hardware device is needed that has the computational, communication and I/O
capabilities to meet the agent demands. EPOCHS uses agent-based intelligent
electronic devices for this purpose so software agents can perform the
necessary protection and control functions needed [31].
Through AgentHQ, agents can get and set messages to each other.
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3.3.5 RTI. The ”glue” holding the high level architecture combinations together is
a control component known as a Runtime Infrastructure (RTI). The RTI routes all
messages between simulation components and ensures that the simulation time is
synchronized across all components [32]. EPOSCHs implements a time-stepped model, in
which each of the component federates executes until a preset simulation time is reached.
In this simulation model, the amount of time between synchronization points has a fixed
length.
3.3.6 Component Interaction. Synchronization of simulators within EPOCHS
follows a simple algorithm. As soon as NS2 and PSS/E begin execution, the RTI halts the
simulators and waits for synchronization messages from both the power simulator and
NS2. The RTI then yields control to AgentHQ, who in turn passes control on to the agents
one by one until all have executed.
During the simulations, this is where agents are sending communication messages
and getting/setting power system variables, which is the basis of how the underlying trust
calculations are made. Once all agents have executed, AgentHQ returns control back to
the RTI, who in turn notifies both NS2 and PSS/E that the current time step is done. The
two simulation engines run for at least one additional time step, ensuring that no more
actions are required.
3.4 System Studied
Experimental simulations make use of a modified version of IEEE’s 145-bus
50-generator test case [64]. The system has been modified by adding a 500 kV line from
bus 1 to bus 25. The rational of this additional line is to create a situation that requires the
use of a special protection system in order to maintain stability.
In general, power systems can sustain the loss of a single tie line. However, most
power systems require remedial action with the loss of a second line, if the line is not
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cleared quickly enough. An additional modification to the IEEE test case is that total
system capacity has been reduced. The lower system capacity makes the power flow along
the main corridor much more important than it is in the original system.
In the IEEE test case, the main SPS agent is located at bus 1, and it identifies extreme
contingencies such as the loss of two lines. It then performs both generation rejection with
preset units and load shedding based upon real-time measurements [64]. The specific
generator to be rejected was determined through simulation studies [32].
Utilizing this modified IEEE 145-bus 50-generator test case, each simulation
implements the same basic template:
1. Power transmission lines are tripped due to malfunction and overloading
The result is a power transmission system imbalance
2. Preplanned action requires removal of a specific generator (93) from the system
The result is an imbalanced and unstable system frequency drop
3. The special protection system relies on calculated trust values of each load node to
intelligently shed load
The goal is regaining system stability by shedding the required amount of load
The specific scenario for this research has been created to allow for robust trust
measurement experimentation.
3.4.1 Special Protection Scheme Action Goal. A key indicator of success
throughout this research is the ability of the system to hold the system’s frequency above
58.8 Hz as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The special protection scheme implemented in this
research is based upon the original EPOCHs research, which employs an algorithm to
determine the precise generation shortfall when a disturbance occurs [32]. Specific
remedial SPS actions are dependant upon the system in which they are applied.
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3.5 Test Scenario
The overall goal of an SPS is to prevent instability and preserve the system’s integrity
within a safe operating range or quickly recover from a critical condition. Critical
disturbances are those expected to have a devastating effect on the power system under a
particular operating condition [3].
The modified trust management SPS test scenarios monitor the power grid’s
frequency for disturbances that are indicative of an imminent fault and attempts to prevent
the fault by generation rejection (Section 2.7.3 and load shedding Section 2.7.4) [21]. In
this test case, two inter-tie power lines are lost causing a protection system condition,
causing the power grid to become transiently unstable, necessitating power generation
rejection.
During simulation on the system described in Section 3.4, dropping generator 93
constitutes a form of dynamic security assurance, where the actions to be taken in
response to a given condition are preplanned [3]. Since generating units can be rapidly
tripped, this is a very effective and efficient means of improving transient stability. For this
scenario, it has been determined through stability studies, that a serious enough condition
exists to call for preplanned control action.
The main SPS agent communicates with generation and load agents to gather data
values and also communicates with agents located at major system or load buses to collect
voltage and frequency measurements as well as load available for shedding [32]. Upon
detection of the impending instability, it is necessary to shed selected loads so that
transient stability is maintained without resorting to system separation, isolation of the
affected region. The SPS employs an algorithm to determine the appropriate amount of
load to shed in order to hold the system’s frequency above 58.8Hz. The load agents are
mainly located at distribution substations and shed load when ordered to do so by the main
SPS agent. Specifically, within each simulation [32]:
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A fault occurs on the line from bus 1 to bus 25 at time 0. The fault is cleared
at 0.07s and a trip command is sent to generator 93 at 0.10s. Since the fault is
cleared after the critical fault-clearing time, the system becomes transiently
unstable and one group of 17 generators loses synchronism with another
group of 33 generators. The main SPS agent at bus 1 recognizes the situation
and begins to communicate with other system agents to gather various data
values and also sends a generation rejection order to agent at bus 93.
Generation rejection keeps the system stable, but without any corrective
action, the frequency drops below the 58.8Hz threshold.
The main agent detects the ”disturbance” created by generation rejection. It
then estimates the disturbance size 1862MW, calculates that there is
2090MW generation remaining and predicts that the steady-state frequency
after the disturbance will be 57.45Hz.
Therefore, although the rejection of generator 93 counteracts the power grid’s
transient instability, it causes an unacceptable decrease in frequency, where the supplied
generator power is less than the load power demanded. Such a frequency drop could
induce a blackout in the power grid similar to the 1965 northeast blackout [61]. Since the
predicted steady-state system frequency of 57.45Hz is below the preset minimum
frequency of 58.8Hz, load shedding is required.
This mandatory load shedding is levied on selected load nodes. If the selected load
shedding nodes are untrusted and refuse to load shed their fair amount, then the special
protection system will fail to maintain the power grid’s frequency above 58.8 Hz [32].If
the selected load shedding nodes are untrusted and refuse to load shed their fair amount,
then the special protection system will fail to maintain the power grid’s frequency above
58.8 Hz [32]. This underlines the importance of the trust management system’s decision
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module selection on trusted nodes for load shedding, recalling that trusted nodes have a
higher probability of successfully completing assigned tasks than untrusted nodes [20].
The trust management’s decision module selects nodes for load shedding based upon
assigned trust values and the amount of load that must be shed. In this research, frequency
information provided by all the nodes is used to determine individual trust values. The
trust management decision module uses this information, and calculates modified
exponentially weighted moving averages algorithm, to select nodes for load shedding and
determine how much each selected node must shed [21].
The trust management decision module then sends each selected node a load shed
message with the load shed amount required by the node, and the trusted nodes load shed
their assigned amount, maintaingin the power grid frequency above 58.8 Hz [20].
3.6 Experimental Design or Test Cases
Computer simulations are used to demonstrate the utility of modified trust
management modules in special protection systems within a power grid. The protection
systems are augmented as follows [21]:
1. The traditional special protection system is augmented with a trust management
module
2. The assignment module utilizes current grid frequency information in a modified
EWMA reputation based manor to establish and assign trust values
3. The fault detection module uses the traditional frequency disturbance mechanism to
detect system conditions indicative of an imminent under-frequency fault
4. The decision module uses a greedy algorithm approach to determine which buses to
select for load shedding
This normality testing is also conducted in related research approaches [10] [21] [54],
and in this research constitutes Stage 1.
3.6.1 Stage 1 (Normality Testing). NS2 has 64 predefined good random seed
values in their random number generator for computer simulation experiments, which are
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equally spaced around a 231 cycle of random numbers [35]. 36 seeds are chosen at random
from NS2’s predefined good random seed values. For Stages 1 and 3, these same 36 seeds
(a set) are utilized so that data can be compared, attempting to minimize any introduced
bias or unwanted variability.
The seeds in each set are used generate a listing of bad nodes that will not be known
to the system during simulation. It is the job of the trust mechanism to effectively
determine which nodes are good and bad. Normality testing is performed for each of the
5, 10 and 15 bad node test cases. Each of these are validated to ensure that the data
generated are normal, allowing additional statistical analysis and inference.
Validation of Normality includes visual inspections of a Histogram and
Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plots, along with further confirmation by the Shapiro-Wilk test
[57]. Results that indicate the simulation generates Normal results means that research can
continue to Stage 2.
3.6.2 Stage 2 (Modified EWMA). Determination of the optimal strategy is Stage 2
of this research and is based on the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) principles
identified in Section 3.2.1. Validation of the optimal strategy is based upon numerical
validation of the True Positive Rate vs. False Positive Rate of the selected strategy as well
as through graphical representation of all strategies on a ROC curve.
Stage 3 incorporates the optimal strategy into the trust module, identified in Section
2.7.7, and determines viability of this new approach.
3.6.3 Stage 3 (5, 10 and 15 Bad Node Frequencies). The goal of Stage 3
experiments is to determine the ability of the modified exponentially weighted moving
averages algorithm, as compared to the special protection system without any trust
management implemented, and related research that examines only the final trust value as
a basis for trustworthiness (equal to λ = 1). The modified EWMA is tested using the
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optimal λ and Trust Threshold values as determined in Section 4.3. The experiments are
completed utilizing modified EWMA Equations, 3.1 and 3.2.
Measurements will focus on the frequency that each simulation is able to maintain,
with the goal being the minimum acceptable value of 58.8 Hz. An Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) and comparison of Confidence Intervals (CI) are used to determine the
statistical significance of the simulation results.
3.7 Analysis
Analysis techniques in this research range from Receiver Operating Characteristics
(ROC) curves to determine appropriate λ and Trust Threshold values, Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) analysis, Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot comparisons and a comparison
of resulting confidence intervals.
3.8 Methodology Summary
A clear research methodology is essential to evaluate the hypothesis contained
herein. In this research, the power transmission system and distributed special protection
system are the component under test. Simulation is selected as the appropriate evaluation
technique and the experimental design is identified to achieve a 99% confidence interval.
Finally, this research methodology serves to identify a method to collect valid data
required to evaluate and analyze the performance of the proposed modified exponentially
weighted moving averages enabled trust system.
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4 Analysis and Results
4.1 Overview
This section describes the results obtained from applying the design described in
Chapter 3, and associated analysis. This analysis is both observational (e.g., identifying
trends, showing success or failure, observing details of what the results show) and
interpretive analysis (e.g., describing why results are the way they are, what underlying
principles contributed to the success or failure).
4.2 Stage 1 (Normality Testing)
Stage 1 simulations were conducted in accordance with the methodology outlined in
Section 3.6.1:
36 seeds are chosen at random from NS2’s predefined good random seed
values. For Stages 1 and 3, these same 36 seeds (a set) are utilized so that data
can be compared, attempting to minimize any introduced bias or unwanted
variability.
The seeds in each set are used generate a listing of bad nodes that will not be
known to the system during simulation. It is the job of the trust mechanism to
effectively determine which nodes are good and bad. Normality testing is
performed for each of the 5, 10 and 15 bad node test cases. Each of these are
validated to ensure that the data generated are normal, allowing additional
statistical analysis and inference.
Represented here are the results from the 5 bad node test cases. If a determination of
Normality can be confirmed, then one can infer that the random bad nodes are indeed
chosen at random and that the data produced from simulation is representative of
real-world results. To that end, outputs from this stage include the visual Normality
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Histogram of Traditional SPS with     
5 Bad Nodes 
Figure 4.1: Histogram Generated from Simulation Results for Traditional SPS with 5 Bad
Nodes)
The Histogram displays characteristics of Normality; namely, a resemblance to the
desired bell curve. Additionally, the linearity of the points identified on the Q-Q plot
suggest that the data are Normally distributed as well.
These positive results help support the notion of Normality and are cause to conduct
one final test, the Shapiro-Wilk Normality test [57]. The Shapiro-Wilk test resulted in a























Quantile-Quantile Plot of Traditional SPS with 5 
Bad Nodes 
Figure 4.2: Quantile-Quantile Plot Generated from Simulation Data for Traditional SPS
with 5 Bad Nodes
The selected 95% confidence interval corresponds to a statistical α value of
5%. Hence, a p-value less than α would cause us to reject the null hypothesis.
The W value is the ratio of the square of an approximate linear combination of
sample ordered statistics by the symmetric estimate of variance. A large value
close to 1 supports the null hypothesis.
As found in related research, both the p-value and w-value are sufficiently large, which
indicates that the sample data was drawn from a Normally distributed population [21]
[54]. The sample size of 36 observations, along with the results of the Histogram, Q-Q
plot and Shapiro-Wilk test, further lend empirical in support of the null hypothesis that the
sample came from Normally distributed data.
Since statistical results help confirm that the simulation environment generates
Normal results, research can continue to Stage 2 to determine the optimal λ and Trust
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Threshold values for the proposed modified exponentially weighted moving averages
algorithm.
4.3 Stage 2 (Modified EWMA)
Stage 2 experiments were conducted in accordance with Methodology Section 3.6.2,
in which the goal was to generate operating characteristic cure in which an optimal λ and
Trust Threshold could be determined. The experiments were to completed utilizing
modified EWMA Equations, 3.1 and 3.2, and success will be measured using properties of
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(0.00, 1.00),  
λ= 0.1, Trust = 0.5 
Figure 4.3: Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve Data with Optimal Strategy Identified;
Point (0.00, 1.00) with λ = 0.1 and Trust Threshold = 0.5
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A closer look at the data behind this point reveals the λ and Trust Threshold that
produced point (0.00, 1.00) are 0.10 and 0.5 respectively, as observed in Figure 4.4. This
point produces a special point on a receiver operating characteristic curve. The point
(0.00, 1.00) in the top left corner denotes perfect classification: 100% true positive rate
and 0% false positive rate [29]. Remaining simulations are conducted utilizing this
optimal strategy.
A complete table of results is located in Appendix A, where all combinations of λ
values ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 are calculated against Trust Thresholds ranging from 0.0 to
0.9, each in 0.1 increments.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
True Positives (TP) 576 576 576 576 561 440 207 119 34
False Positives (FP) 502 392 271 116 71 0 0 0 0
True Negatives (TN) 38 148 269 424 469 540 540 540 540
False Negatives (FN) 0 0 0 0 15 136 369 457 542
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.76 0.36 0.21 0.06
0.93 0.73 0.50 0.21 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
True Positives (TP) 576 576 576 576 576 464 326 124 64
False Positives (FP) 484 373 208 83 0 0 0 0 0
True Negatives (TN) 56 167 332 457 540 540 540 540 540
False Negatives (FN) 0 0 0 0 0 112 250 452 512
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.57 0.22 0.11
0.90 0.69 0.39 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
True Positives (TP) 576 576 576 540 499 462 332 148 106
False Positives (FP) 412 373 224 117 67 36 0 0 0
True Negatives (TN) 128 167 316 423 473 504 540 540 540
False Negatives (FN) 0 0 0 36 77 114 244 428 470
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.87 0.80 0.58 0.26 0.18
0.76 0.69 0.41 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
True Positives (TP) 576 576 540 540 540 427 332 177 124
False Positives (FP) 412 357 224 139 36 36 36 0 0
True Negatives (TN) 128 183 316 401 504 504 504 540 540
False Negatives (FN) 0 0 36 36 36 149 244 399 452
1.00 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.74 0.58 0.31 0.22
0.76 0.66 0.41 0.26 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00
True Positives (TP) 576 540 540 540 520 427 351 260 147
False Positives (FP) 378 296 207 139 52 36 36 36 0
True Negatives (TN) 162 244 333 401 488 504 504 504 540
False Negatives (FN) 0 36 36 36 56 149 225 316 429
1.00 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.74 0.61 0.45 0.26
0.70 0.55 0.38 0.26 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00
True Positives (TP) 559 540 540 520 460 460 377 298 182
False Positives (FP) 362 262 197 100 100 52 36 36 19
True Negatives (TN) 178 278 343 440 440 488 504 504 521
False Negatives (FN) 17 36 36 56 116 116 199 278 394
0.97 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.65 0.52 0.32







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





















Figure 4.4: Receiver Operating Characteristic Data With Optimal Strategy for λ and Trust
Threshold Value Identifi d
In summary, although perfect classification is realized in this research, the ability of
the system to maintain the minimum acceptable frequency of 58.8 Hz throughout each of
the 5, 10 and 15 bad node test cases must still be validated in the next Stage.
52
4.4 Stage 3 (5, 10 and 15 Bad Node Frequencies)
Stage 3 experiments were conducted in accordance with Methodology Section 3.6.3,
in which the goal was to determine the ability of the modified exponentially weighted
moving averages algorithm, as compared to the special protection system without any
trust management implemented. The modified EWMA is tested using the optimal λ and
Trust Threshold values as determined in Section 4.3:
The goal of Stage 3 experiments is to determine the ability of the modified
exponentially weighted moving averages algorithm, as compared to the
special protection system without any trust management implemented, and
related research that examines only the final trust value as a basis for
trustworthiness (equal to λ = 1).
The experiments were to completed utilizing modified EWMA Equations, 3.1 and
3.2, and the resulting optimal strategy that was identified in Figure 4.3. Figures 4.5
contains the results of the 15 bad node test case implemented with the optimal strategy.
At the 95% confidence interval, the modified EWMA trust module is able to maintain
the frequency above the minimum acceptable frequency of 58.8 Hz during each individual
simulation with the optimal strategy implemented. Conversely, the other two teat cases the
15 bad node test case are not able to make the same claim. Figure 4.6 represents
traditional reputation based trust approaches, which examine only the most recent trust
observation to determine trustworthiness. This equates to a λ value of 1, as labeled in the
graph. Upon further examination, figure 4.6 reveals that this approach to trust does
achieve the required minimum acceptable frequency of 58.8 Hz some of the time with
95% confidence. However, the same confidence interval also reveals that a majority of the


















Simulation Time in Seconds 
Frequency Observations for Optimally Modified 
EWMA with 15 Bad Nodes at 95% CI 
Minimum Acceptable Frequency of 58.8 Hz 


















Simulation Time in Seconds 
Frequency Observations  Trust Module with EWMA 
(λ = 1, Trust Threshold = 0.5) with 15 Bad Nodes at 
95% CI 
Minimum Acceptable  
Frequency of 58.8 Hz 
Figure 4.6: Frequency Observations for Traditional EWMA Trust Implementation (λ = 1,
Trust Threshold = 0.5) with 15 Bad Nodes at 95% Confidence Interval
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Finally, Figure 4.7 identifies the frequency observations associated with an
implementation that does not utilize trust. As identified in the graph, with 95%
confidence, each of the test cases can be expected to fail when there 15 bad nodes and no


















Simulation Time in Seconds 
Frequency Observations for NO TRUST with 15 Bad 
Nodes at 95% CI 
Minimum Acceptable Frequency of 58.8 Hz 
Figure 4.7: Frequency Observations for No Trust with 15 Bad Nodes at 95% Confidence
Interval
Similar tests were conducted for both the 5 and 10 bad node test cases. The final
frequency at the 95% confidence interval of each of these test cases are averaged and
presented in Figure 4.8. As expected, each of the test cases with the modified EWMA
trust module implemented maintains the frequency well above the minimum acceptable
frequency. Conversely, with no trust module implemented, only the 5 bad node test case is
able to meet the 58.8 Hz threshold.
Additionally, the Two-Factor Without Replication ANOVA Test analysis confirms the
visual observations of this stage. Specifically, the test indicates a statistically significant






















Number of Bad Nodes 
Comparison of Test Cases With 5, 10 and 15 Bad 
Nodes at 95% CI 
Special Protection System (SPS) without Trust Module 
Special Protection System (SPS) with Trust Module (λ = 1, trust threshold = 0.5) 
Special Protection System (SPS) with Optimal Trust Module (λ = 0.1, trust threshold = 0.5) 
Mimimum Acceptable 
Frequency of 58.8 Hz 
Figure 4.8: Comparison of Final Frequency Values for 5, 10 and 15 Bad Nodes at 95%
Confidence Interval
each of the 5, 10 and 15 bad node test cases, as f-values > f-critical values and p-values <
0.05 in each case. The cases that visually appear to have possible confidence interval
overlap within Figure 4.8 are found within the 5 bad node cases that implement trust
modules (λ = 1 and λ = 0.1 respectively). The ANOVA results for this analysis are f-value
= 5.925, f-critical value = 4.121 and p-value = 0.020. At the 95% confidence interval,
these ANOVA results are indicative of statistical difference.
One final ANOVA analysis of interest examined whether the optimal trust module
strategies were statistically different between the 5, 10 and 15 bad node test cases, as the
graph in Figure 4.8 would lead one to believe there is no difference. ANOVA analysis
confirms this visual observation. The ANOVA results for this analysis are f-value = 0.781,
f-critical value = 3.128 and p-value = 0.462. At the 95% confidence interval, these
ANOVA results indicate a lack of statistical difference.
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4.5 Analysis and Results Summary
In summary, the results of this research indicate that a modified exponentially
weighted moving averages algorithm can successfully be applied to the trust module of a
special protection system. In fact, between the 5, 10 and 15 bad node test cases, there was
no statistical difference between the optimal trust strategy results. This was expected as
the ROC curve in Figure 4.3 identified the strategy that ensured no false positives and no
false negatives. Actual testing followed suit exactly. The simulation results fully support
the use of the modified EWMA algorithm presented in this thesis for future smart grid
special protections systems that implement reputation based trust.
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a conclusion of the work presented in this thesis. Just as
important, this chapter also provides recommendation for future research. The results of
the research in this thesis were so promising, that there are numerous follow-on
experiments that can and should be done with regard to the modified exponentially
weighted moving averages algorithm created herein.
5.2 Conclusions of Research
The main contribution of this thesis is the development and application of the
modified Exponentially Weighted Moving Algorithm EWMA algorithm, and its ability to
flawlessly function in the face varying numbers of bad (malicious or malfunctioning)
special protection system nodes. This algorithm and its application contained herein
should be implemented across current and future smart grid special protection system
implementations.
Simulation results support the use of the proposed modified EWMA reputation based
trust module in special protection systems within a smart grid environment. This
modification resulted in the ability to maintain the associated frequency above the
minimum acceptable frequency of 58.8 Hz in each of the 5, 10 and 15 bad node test cases
at the 95% confidence interval. With regard to the modified EWMA algorithm itself,
research concluded that the optimal λ and Trust Threshold create a trust module that is
able to determine good nodes with a 100% true positive accuracy, and 0% false positive
rate, resulting in a perfect classification scenario.
It is not the assertion of this researcher that the application of the modified EWMA
algorithm to specific SPS architecture will create a perfect classification strategy, but
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rather, that an optimal strategy will be revealed when the techniques described in this
thesis are applied. This optimal strategy, by definition, promises to maximize true
positives and minimize false positives.
Additionally, it is important to note that utilizing simulation frequencies and the
method in which the ”true” frequencies are determined was not a primal factor in this
research. Rather, the frequencies, and how they were measured, are only representative of
the type of data that that can be imputed into the decision cycle of a reputation based trust
special protection system. Future smart grid technologies and emerging SCADA intrusion
detection technologies promise to increase the quantity of data available to make smarter
trust calculations.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
Although not always attainable, a perfect classification for each specific application,
as was realized in this research, is the goal for implementation at each field site. To this
end, there are numerous recommendations for future research:
• As briefly touched upon in Section 5.2, there are numerous inputs that the smart
grid promises to make available as possible inputs to the trust calculation of the
future (e.g., demand response participation, amount of load drawn by the node and
the nodes ability/willingness to contribute power in the event of an emergency).
These, as well as bolt-on technologies that have been created could serve as
additional inputs to future iterations of this research. An example of one such input
is a SCADA intrusion detection systems that monitors the SCADA network or
system activities for malicious activities or policy violations. It is theorized that
such inputs should weigh quite heavily as they could be alerting on an actual
malicious event.
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In addition to λ, these additional weighing factors can be included, and an optimal
strategy can be subsequently determine based upon all inputs and their associated
weights.
• The current simulation environment utilizes a window size of 16 to calculate the
modified EWMA trust values. Due to the fact that data is continuously being
generated and monitored within the smart grid, the actual window could be quite
large. This large window promises to give an even better estimate of the actual trust
value, as there is certainly more historical data on which to base the final trust value.
To this end, additional simulations were conducted to see exactly where the current





















Number of Bad Nodes 
Comparison of 5, 10, 15-21 Bad Node Test Cases with Optimal Trust 
Module (λ = 0.1, Trust Threshold = 0.5) at 95% CI 
Special Protection 
System (SPS) with 
Optimal Trust Module 
(λ = 0.1, trust 
threshold = 0.5) 
Figure 5.1: Comparison of 5, 10, 15-21 Bad Node Test Cases with Optimal Trust Module
(λ = 0.1, Trust Threshold - 0.5) at 95% Confidence Interval
With the current window size, the most bad nodes that the system can manage, while
ensuring that the minimum acceptable frequency is maintained with 95% confidence
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is 19. Perhaps a larger window size will allow for a more bad-node-tolerant system.
In exploring this facet of the algorithm, one must weight the cost of additional
storage capacity for larger histories vs the desire to generate a more accurate trust.
• It is important to determine the robustness and appropriateness of the modified
EWMA enhanced trust module across a variety of simulation environments.
Numerous electrical power simulations exist, and the applicability of this algorithm
to multiple testing environments will only lend credibly to its value and need for
immediate real-world implementation.
In summary, implementation of a modified EWMA within a reputation based special
protection system does account for each scenario that an electrical power engineer may
face in the field. Instead, this research demonstrates that it provides a robust algorithm to
incorporate within and test these challenges and/or opportunities upon.
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Appendix: Receiver Operating Characteristic Data
Table A.1: Receiver Operating Characteristic Data Used to Determine Appropriate λ and
Trust Threshold Values (1 of 2)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
True Positives (TP) 576 576 576 576 561 440 207 119 34
False Positives (FP) 502 392 271 116 71 0 0 0 0
True Negatives (TN) 38 148 269 424 469 540 540 540 540
False Negatives (FN) 0 0 0 0 15 136 369 457 542
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.76 0.36 0.21 0.06
0.93 0.73 0.50 0.21 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
True Positives (TP) 576 576 576 576 576 464 326 124 64
False Positives (FP) 484 373 208 83 0 0 0 0 0
True Negatives (TN) 56 167 332 457 540 540 540 540 540
False Negatives (FN) 0 0 0 0 0 112 250 452 512
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.57 0.22 0.11
0.90 0.69 0.39 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
True Positives (TP) 576 576 576 540 499 462 332 148 106
False Positives (FP) 412 373 224 117 67 36 0 0 0
True Negatives (TN) 128 167 316 423 473 504 540 540 540
False Negatives (FN) 0 0 0 36 77 114 244 428 470
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.87 0.80 0.58 0.26 0.18
0.76 0.69 0.41 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
True Positives (TP) 576 576 540 540 540 427 332 177 124
False Positives (FP) 412 357 224 139 36 36 36 0 0
True Negatives (TN) 128 183 316 401 504 504 504 540 540
False Negatives (FN) 0 0 36 36 36 149 244 399 452
1.00 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.74 0.58 0.31 0.22
0.76 0.66 0.41 0.26 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00
True Positives (TP) 576 540 540 540 520 427 351 260 147
False Positives (FP) 378 296 207 139 52 36 36 36 0
True Negatives (TN) 162 244 333 401 488 504 504 504 540
False Negatives (FN) 0 36 36 36 56 149 225 316 429
1.00 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.74 0.61 0.45 0.26
0.70 0.55 0.38 0.26 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00
True Positives (TP) 559 540 540 520 460 460 377 298 182
False Positives (FP) 362 262 197 100 100 52 36 36 19
True Negatives (TN) 178 278 343 440 440 488 504 504 521
False Negatives (FN) 17 36 36 56 116 116 199 278 394
0.97 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.65 0.52 0.32




























Table A.2: Receiver Operating Characteristic Data Used to Determine Appropriate λ and
Trust Threshold Values (2 of 2)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
True Positives (TP) 540 540 520 460 460 460 445 343 240
False Positives (FP) 312 235 121 100 100 100 52 36 36
True Negatives (TN) 228 305 419 440 440 440 488 504 504
False Negatives (FN) 36 36 56 116 116 116 131 233 336
0.94 0.94 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.77 0.60 0.42
0.58 0.44 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.07
True Positives (TP) 540 540 460 460 460 460 460 343 343
False Positives (FP) 235 235 100 100 100 100 100 36 36
True Negatives (TN) 305 305 440 440 440 440 440 504 504
False Negatives (FN) 36 36 116 116 116 116 116 233 233
0.94 0.94 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.60
0.44 0.44 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.07 0.07
True Positives (TP) 540 460 460 460 460 460 460 460 343
False Positives (FP) 235 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 36
True Negatives (TN) 305 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 504
False Negatives (FN) 36 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 233
0.94 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.60
0.44 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.07
True Positives (TP) 460 460 460 460 460 460 460 460 460
False Positives (FP) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
True Negatives (TN) 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
False Negatives (FN) 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
True Positives (TP) 460 460 460 460 460 460 460 460 460
False Positives (FP) 111 111 112 107 106 111 111 100 100
True Negatives (TN) 429 429 428 433 434 429 429 440 440
False Negatives (FN) 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
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